Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 60

Posted on by

Today I’ll describe a little secret – a stealthy autostart key that is not very well-known and is very reliable since it is used by… well… the Windows Update.

Yup, it’s a pretty handy one…

This is the key:

  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WindowsUpdate\Setup\ServiceStartup

It has two interesting properties:

  • It can be used as a persistence mechanism
  • It can also mysteriously make files re-appear on the system as the mechanism is used to update files and as such, the entries are being used to copy files during the system start (by the ‘svchost.exe -k netsvcs’ process)

This is an example entry:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WindowsUpdate\Setup\ServiceStartup\malware.dll
"RegistrationFlags"=dword:00000001
"CacheFile"="C:\\test\\malware.dll"
"TargetFile"="C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\malware.dll"

The entry will force the file:

  • C:\test\malware.dll

to be loaded.

It will be also copied to:

  • C:\WINDOWS\system32\malware.dll

Note that you can also simply ignore the copying and drop the file anywhere, and just point ‘CacheFile’ and ‘TargetFile’ to it.

If you look at the first screenshot you will notice the Procmon logs show a reference to the ’20MUIFixUp’ entry.

Interestingly, this entry can be used to just copy files, so adding a reg combo as below:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WindowsUpdate\Setup\ServiceStartup\malware.dll
"20MUIFixUp"=dword:00000001
"CacheFile"="C:\\test\\malware.dll"
"TargetFile"="C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\malware.dll"

will create ‘C:\WINDOWS\system32\malware.dll’ anytime you boot the system (but the file won’t be loaded/executed). The’ 20MUIFixUp’ entry in the Registry will be deleted afterwards (so it needs to be re-created).

Interestingly, the information about the loaded DLLs can be found inside the Windows Update log file:

  • c:\WINDOWS\WindowsUpdate.log

Here’s an excerpt:

Misc    Registering binary: C:\WINDOWS\system32\regsvr32.exe  /s "C:\WINDOWS\system32\malware.dll"
Misc    FATAL: Self registration of C:\WINDOWS\system32\malware.dll failed, error = 0x8024D007
Setup    FATAL: Failed to register C:\WINDOWS\system32\malware.dll: error 0x8024d007
Setup    FATAL: ProcessDelayedCopies failed: 0x8024d007
Service    FATAL: Failed to fix up registration at service startup: 0x8024d007

My test DLL was not prepared correctly (missing exported ‘DllInstall’ – see below), but the DLL still loads.

At least on Windows XP.

Okay, what about newer versions of Windows?

First, let’s fix my DLL.

To do so, I actually add two exported functions:

  • DllInstall, and
  • DllRegisterServer.

Why?

Because the ‘RegistrationFlags’ parameter can be equal either to ‘1’ or ‘2’.

If it is 1, the ‘DllInstall’ API will be called. Otherwise, it will be the ‘DllRegisterServer’ API.

When these DLLs are loaded and respective functions are called the Windows Update service logs the appropriate information to the ‘WindowsUpdate.log’ file – let’s have a look at the two examples:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WindowsUpdate\Setup\ServiceStartup\malware.dll
"RegistrationFlags"=dword:00000001
"CacheFile"="C:\\test\\malware.dll"
"TargetFile"="C:\\test\\malware.dll"

and

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WindowsUpdate\Setup\ServiceStartup\malware.dll
"RegistrationFlags"=dword:00000002
"CacheFile"="C:\\test\\malware.dll"
"TargetFile"="C:\\test\\malware.dll"

When Windows Update service is restarted, you will get the following log entries inside the WindowsUpdate.log:

"RegistrationFlags"=dword:00000001
Misc    Registering binary: C:\Windows\system32\regsvr32.exe  /s "C:\test\malware.dll"
Agent      * WU client version 7.6.7600.256
Agent      * Base directory: C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution
Agent      * Access type: No proxy
Agent      * Network state: Connected

"RegistrationFlags"=dword:00000002
Misc    Registering binary: C:\Windows\system32\regsvr32.exe  /s /n /i "c:\test\malware.dll"
Agent      * WU client version 7.6.7600.256
Agent      * Base directory: C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution
Agent      * Access type: No proxy
Agent      * Network state: Connected

The trick works like a charm for Windows 7. I don’t see it working on Windows 10 though, but perhaps it has to be triggered some other way.

Enter Sandbox – part 14: Reading the old Delphi Scrolls…

Posted on by

Sandboxing regular PE (not .NET) files is easy and tricky at the same time. API monitoring is trivial. What is not is not is this:

  • The crazy number of API functions (Native, Win32)
  • Function calls that are a bit harder to monitor, because the functionality is delivered via a complex maze of virtual tables f.ex. COM
  • Monitoring of functions or methods that are placed on a higher level of abstraction f.ex. scripts (AutoIT, VBS, VBA), as well as installers (f.ex. NullSoft)
  • The variety of library functions that are included inside the executables (statically)

The last item on the list requires a bit more attention.

Hooking API, or intercepting their calls any other way is relatively easy as long as you know where they are (and perhaps can handle the stolen bytes well since some malware is using this trick). With code embedded directly inside the executable there is no import table, no list of pointers of any kind, no virtual tables, no RTTI, nothing. Of course, using tools like IDA, or a good disassembly library, or perhaps instrumented execution it may be possible to determine the exact location of these functions, but it’s a pretty complex and time consuming task, especially for commercial sandboxes that must run FAST.

On top of that, there is another issue. The code is not located at a fixed address, but can be placed all over the place. No, I am not talking about ASLR. I am talking about wrappers that use RunPE to run executables from memory. If you intercept Windows API calls, running programs via RunPE doesn’t make a difference – the APIs will eventually be executing from a known location inside the system libraries in memory. With relocated code the statically linked functions need to be found _every_ time the executable is loaded, mapped to a different processes, or simply relocated (direct code inject, process hollowing, some unpackers, etc.). Yes, for the malware that spawns a number of child processes and plays with RunPE a number of times during the session it will significantly slow down the tagging of functions in memory.

So… after a bit of scaremongering let’s have a look at a very good example.

The enfant terrible of programs that are truly annoying for analysis are Delphi executables (and all the other brands of Delphish executables f.es. Embarcadero). They rely heavily on the custom Delphi libraries and as such are hard to understand no matter whether they are debugged, or disassembled. Of course, there exist good decompilers that can help a lot, and flirt signatures for Delphi executables do a lot of magic during static program analysis as well. However, I am not aware of any of the available sandboxes or monitors doing dynamic analysis of Delphi code during the run-time.

I remember the moment when I tested the first Delphi function hooking that I implemented a few years ago. My mind was blown. The sudden insight into the program business logic that the hooking gave me was incredible… !!!

I hope this functionality will be implemented in commercial sandboxes soon. There is a tremendous amount of metadata just waiting to be discovered…

Let’s have a look at a couple of examples – the one below shows a progressive parsing of the config for a trojan:

LStrPos |, <someip>|1337|IPKServer|IPKMutex|encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, <someip>|1337|IPKServer|IPKMutex|encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, <someip>|1337|IPKServer|IPKMutex|encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, 1337|IPKServer|IPKMutex|encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, 1337|IPKServer|IPKMutex|encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, 1337|IPKServer|IPKMutex|encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, IPKServer|IPKMutex|encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, IPKServer|IPKMutex|encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, IPKServer|IPKMutex|encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, IPKMutex|encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, IPKMutex|encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, IPKMutex|encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, encpassword|-1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, -1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, -1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, -1|AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, AdobeART.exe|AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, AdobeART|-1|
LStrPos |, -1|
LStrPos |, -1|
LStrPos |, -1|
LStrPos |,

This example shows a comparison of characters and the string ‘apocalypse’ can be read from a series of string comparisons:

LStrCmp2 (substring=a, string=|)
LStrCmp2 (substring=p, string=|)
LStrCmp2 (substring=o, string=|)
LStrCmp2 (substring=c, string=|)
LStrCmp2 (substring=a, string=|)
LStrCmp2 (substring=l, string=|)
LStrCmp2 (substring=y, string=|)
LStrCmp2 (substring=p, string=|)
LStrCmp2 (substring=s, string=|)
LStrCmp2 (substring=e, string=|)

Another example almost instantly tells me that the program requires a command line parameter:

WStrCmp (substring=, string=/debug)

What about Delphi-based Anti-routines? This is a whole new unexplored of area !!!

LStrPos (substring=SNIFFER, string=EXPLORER.EXE)

LStrPos (substring=WINDUMP, string=EXPLORER.EXE)

LStrPos (substring=NETPRYER, string=EXPLORER.EXE)

And last example – DarkComet config processing:

LStrCmp (substring=, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=\, string=\)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=NETDATA)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=NETDATA)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=NETDATA)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=NETDATA)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=NETDATA)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SID)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=SID)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=SID)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=MUTEX)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=MUTEX)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=EDTPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=EDTPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=EDTPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=EDTPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=EDTPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=EDTPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=EDTPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=EDTPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=COMBOPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=COMBOPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=COMBOPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=COMBOPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=COMBOPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=COMBOPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=COMBOPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=COMBOPATH)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=11)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=-1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=0)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=2)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=3)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=4)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=5)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=6)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=7)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=8)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=9)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=10)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=00df86ce377d71e66cb2451c446fede8, string=)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=INSTALL)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=INSTALL)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=INSTALL)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=INSTALL)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=INSTALL)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=INSTALL)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=INSTALL)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=INSTALL)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=FAKEMSG)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=FAKEMSG)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=FAKEMSG)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=FAKEMSG)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=FAKEMSG)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=FAKEMSG)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=FAKEMSG)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=FAKEMSG)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=PDNS)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=PDNS)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=PDNS)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=PDNS)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=PDNS)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=PDNS)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=PDNS)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=PDNS)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=FILEATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=FILEATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=FILEATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=FILEATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=FILEATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=FILEATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=FILEATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=FILEATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=DIRATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=DIRATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=DIRATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=DIRATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=DIRATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=DIRATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=DIRATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=DIRATTRIB)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=CHIDEF)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=CHIDEF)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=CHIDEF)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=CHIDEF)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=CHIDEF)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=CHIDEF)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=CHIDEF)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=CHIDEF)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=CHIDED)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=CHIDED)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=CHIDED)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=CHIDED)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=CHIDED)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=CHIDED)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=CHIDED)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=CHIDED)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=BIND)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=BIND)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=BIND)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=BIND)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=BIND)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=BIND)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=BIND)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=BIND)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=PLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=PLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=PLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=PLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=PLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=PLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=PLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=PLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=PERSINST)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=PERSINST)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=PERSINST)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=PERSINST)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=PERSINST)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=PERSINST)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=PERSINST)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=PERSINST)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH1)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=SH1)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=SH1)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=SH1)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=SH1)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=SH1)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=SH1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH3)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=SH3)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=SH3)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=SH3)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=SH3)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=SH3)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=SH3)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH3)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH4)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=SH4)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=SH4)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=SH4)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=SH4)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=SH4)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=SH4)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH4)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH5)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=SH5)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=SH5)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=SH5)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=SH5)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=SH5)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=SH5)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH5)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH6)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=SH6)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=SH6)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=SH6)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=SH6)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=SH6)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=SH6)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH6)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH7)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=SH7)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=SH7)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=SH7)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=SH7)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=SH7)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=SH7)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH7)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH8)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=SH8)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=SH8)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=SH8)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=SH8)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=SH8)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=SH8)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH8)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH9)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=SH9)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=SH9)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=SH9)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=SH9)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=SH9)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=SH9)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH9)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH10)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=SH10)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=SH10)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=SH10)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=SH10)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=SH10)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=SH10)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=SH10)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=MULTIBIND)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=MULTIBIND)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=MULTIBIND)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=MULTIBIND)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=MULTIBIND)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=MULTIBIND)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=MULTIBIND)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=MULTIBIND)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=MULTIPLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=MULTIPLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=MULTIPLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=MULTIPLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=MULTIPLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=MULTIPLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=MULTIPLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=MULTIPLUGS)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=FWB)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=FWB)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=FWB)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=FWB)
LStrCmp (substring=0, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=GENCODE)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=PERS)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=PERS)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=PERS)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=PERS)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=PERS)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=PERS)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=PERS)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=PERS)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=PWD)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=PWD)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=PWD)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=PWD)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=PWD)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=PWD)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=PWD)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=PWD)
LStrCmp (substring=, string=OFFLINEK)
LStrCmp (substring=MUTEX, string=OFFLINEK)
LStrCmp (substring=SID, string=OFFLINEK)
LStrCmp (substring=FWB, string=OFFLINEK)
LStrCmp (substring=NETDATA, string=OFFLINEK)
LStrCmp (substring=GENCODE, string=OFFLINEK)
LStrCmp (substring=OFFLINEK, string=OFFLINEK)
LStrCmp (substring=1, string=1)
LStrCmp (substring=Unknow, string=Unknow)