Propagate, Ribbonate

December 22, 2020 in Anti-Forensics, Code Injection, Forensic Analysis, Malware Analysis

I thought Propagate technique is a dead horse. Described, implemented, used in malware.


There is perhaps one more possibility, or four.

When you open Windows Explorer and Ribbons are enabled:

the UIRibbon.dll DLL gets loaded into this process address space:

One of the things the DLL does is setting properties of its internal windows using the following methods:

  • HWndContainer::Build(HWND hWnd, char a2, struct HWndContainer **a3)
    • Property:0xA91C
  • OfficeSpace::Root::SetEventLogger(OfficeSpace::Root *this, struct IUIEventLogger *a2)
    • Property: 0xBCDE
  • NetUI::SetCommandManager(HWND hWnd, HWND hData, struct NetUI::ICommandManager *a3)
    • Property:0xBCDF
  • UXHwndEffectsManager::FInitialize@(HANDLE hData@, HWND hWnd@, bool a3, bool a4, bool a5)


So, what do we do with this?

These are all possible targets for a Propagate code injection as all these properties appear to be holding virtual table pointers…

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