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A few more anti-sandbox tricks…

May 31, 2020 in Anti-*, Sandboxing

Update 2020-06-03

Added more details on MOVES, HABO and Jujubox

Old Post

Today I spotted an article comparing various sandboxes being posted on Twitter. I noticed many of sandboxes present on VirusTotal were not covered in that article so I reviewed a couple of reports and added these sandboxes to the list. While doing so, I picked up a few sandbox characteristics that seem to be fixed, and as such, can lead to programmatic identification of these solutions. In my opinion, sandboxes that don’t provide a randomized environment (different user, different system profile) are relatively easy to detect and sandbox creators need to take this into account to ensure their products remain stealthy. Also, providing screenshots is one of the easiest way to make profile available to attackers. I wonder if creating a fake desktop image could help here (window sized to the screen/workarea resolution and presenting a picture of a fake desktop)

Below are notes I took:

JujuBox

  • User: masked in reports as <USER>, but SID is not
  • SID: S-1-5-21-364843204-231886559-199882026-1001
  • OS version: not licensed and detectable via a trick I described a few days ago
  • Desktop includes Acrobat Reader, Firefox, Google Chrome, Open Office 4.1.6, Steam, accounting, eula, mydoc, mypresentation, OpenOffice, party, and stats — file extensions are not shown, but easy to guess
  • filename is a <SHA256 hash>.exe
  • Screen resolution seems to be low – 800x 600?
  • Only 4 icons on the taskbar


VenusEye

  • User: debug4fun

Yomi Hunter

  • User: j.yoroi

NSFOCUS POMA

  • OS: XP
  • User: sys
  • File: C:\Windows\Temp\sample\<md5>_<sha256>.exe

BitDam ATP

  • User: trans_iso_0

QiAnXin RedDrip

  • User: Administrator
  • System language: zh-CN

Tencent Habo

  • User: Administrator
  • SID: S-1-5-21-1482476501-1645522239-1417001333-500
  • File: sample.doc
  • Hostname: ANALYST<DIGIT>-<HEX>
  • OS: XP (refers to C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator)
  • System language: zh-CN
  • Directory present:
    • C:\DiskD
  • File: 996e.exe (this file name is so prevalent that it even raises questions on Reddit); wild speculation: I wonder if it comes from a Unicode character Ux996E (щео) which means ‘drink’; the reports attempt to remove information about the process name, but do so inefficiently as shown on the below screenshot
  • Other possible fingerprints:
    • OFFICE11 (C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\OFFICE11\WINWORD.EXE)
    • Python
      • C:\Python\Python27
      • C:\Python\Python36

SecondWrite

  • User: Virtual
  • File: <hash> of the file and starts from %TEMP%\<hash>.exe

Dr.Web vxCube

  • Hides lots of information from the report, these guys know what they are doing (e.g. sample path is listed as <PATH_SAMPLE.EXE>)
  • OS: XP
  • Other possible fingerprints:
    • %CommonProgramFiles(x86)%\microsoft shared\vs7debug\mdm.exe
    • Office14 (%ProgramFiles%\microsoft office\office14)

Rising MOVES

  • User: Administrator
  • System language: zh-CN
  • Service present:
    • badrv
  • Kernel Driver present:
    • rs_badrv
  • Files present:
    • c:\analyse\drop_files.zip
    • c:\analyse\result.zip
    • C:\analyse\log.log
    • C:\analyse\analyzer.exe
    • c:/analyse/gen_report.py
    • C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\gspawn-win32-helper.exe
  • Mutex:
    • ba_probe_event_memory_mutex

VirusTotal Cuckoofork

  • User: admin
  • Hostname: USER-PC
  • Other possible fingerprints:
    • starts sample from c:\ root directory
    • filename is a SHA256 hash

Lastline

  • User: Johnson, Olivia (randomized)
  • Other possible fingerprints:
    • Office14
      • C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
    • Office16
      • C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE

VMRay

  • User: nice to see proper randomization e.g. ‘aETAdzjz’
  • Other possible fingerprints:
    • Office16
      • C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE

VirusTotal Box of Apples

  • User: user1

OS X Sandbox

  • Other possible fingerprints:
    • VMWare path mapped
      • Library/Filesystems/vmhgfs.fs

VirusTotal Androbox

  • n/a

VirusTotal Droidy

  • User: user

Windows API\tparsed\teasily

May 31, 2020 in Archaeology, Malware Analysis, Sandboxing

When I wrote my first API monitor around year 2004 I had a real struggle finding prototypes of Windows API, because there was not that much documentation available at that time. I remember extracting data from various sources, including a classic WIN32.HLP file.

As time progressed I got well versed in progressive versions of MSDN/SDK/DDK Help file versions decompilation: HLP files with HelpDeco, CHM files hh, hxs with VSHIK (HxComp.exe IIRC), and finally connecting out to the local server on http://127.0.0.1:47873 to retrieve XML files.

Today you just need to download a repo of source files from Github.

Within minutes you can get a file like this: